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JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF INJURY: THE INFLUENCE OF 
NEW ZEALAND’S ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME ON THE 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW 
SIMON CONNELL
∗ 
New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme replaced compensatory damages for 
personal injury with a no-fault redistributive scheme. The central thesis of this article is 
that the scheme, and its influence on the civil and criminal law in New Zealand, can be 
better understood in terms of the interplay between corrective, retributive and 
distributive justice. The orthodox view that the scheme was an abandonment of the 
corrective and retributive justice for injury victims in favour of distributive justice is 
challenged, and it is argued that Parliament has a crucial role in deciding between 
conceptions of justice. Parliament’s performance of that function is assessed, as is the 
performance of the Courts in terms of implementing statute law and developing the 
common law. Ultimately, the article concludes that the ACC scheme has had major 
unintended consequences, resulting from attempts to serve competing conceptions of a 
just outcome between causer and victim of injury. 
A. Introduction 
The introduction of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme (the 
“ACC”1 scheme) meant the death of claims for compensatory damages for 
personal injury – “an unparalleled event in our cultural history, the first 
casualty among the core legal institutions of the civilized world.”2 This article 
explores the influence of ACC on the civil and criminal law in New Zealand. 
Corrective justice, retributive justice and distributive justice can provide 
competing accounts of a just outcome for victims and causers of injury. 
Underpinning this paper is the idea that the scheme and its influence can be 
better understood by considering the interplay between these conceptions of 
justice. Pre-ACC personal injury actions to some extent served all three of 
these conceptions of justice.3 Abolishing damages for personal injury and 
replacing them with the redistributive ACC scheme was a significant step in 
the pursuit of distributive justice. The orthodox view is that the introduction of 
ACC was an abandonment of corrective and retributive justice in favour of 
distributive justice. I will argue that the law continues to pursue corrective and 
retributive justice for injury victims. I demonstrate this by identifying two 
areas of law, in statute and cases, where society continues to pursue corrective 
                                                          
∗ University of Otago, New Zealand.  
1 References to “ACC” in this paper generally mean the scheme, but may, as context requires, 
mean the Accident Compensation Corporation that administers it. 
2 John G Fleming and Pablo Drobny “A Word from the Editors” (1973) 21 AJCL at xi. 
3 By “served” I mean that personal injury actions could produce outcomes which provided 
“justice” in each sense – which is not to say that these outcomes were necessarily intended to 
pursue one sense of justice in particular. See the discussion of the distinction between 
performative function and purposive function in Allan Beever “The Law’s Function and the 
Judicial Function” (2003) 20 NZULR 299. 
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and retributive justice for injury victims by providing compensation to injury 
victims and by responding to wrongdoing that causes injury. 
As a consequence of showing that different conceptions of justice are still 
appropriate to pursue after ACC, the role of Parliament in clarifying when one 
conception trumps another becomes important, if not crucial. Thus it remains 
to assess Parliament’s performance, and I will identify two areas where 
Parliament has failed to act clearly and consistently. It is also appropriate to 
consider the performance of the courts, in terms of the interpretation of 
legislation and the development of the common law. 
Ultimately, I conclude that the ACC scheme has had major unintended 
consequences for the civil and criminal law in New Zealand. These 
consequences can be better understood by considering the scheme, and the 
developments that followed it, as being a result of attempts to serve different 
conceptions of a just outcome between victim and causer of injury. 
B. Conceptions of Justice 
1. Corrective justice  
In the context of injury, corrective justice is concerned with wrongful losses 
inflicted by one person on another.4 In the context of law, it is the idea that 
liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another.5 For 
corrective justice, a just outcome following a wrongful loss inflicted by one 
person on another is that the wrongdoer puts right the loss he or she has 
caused, typically by a payment of compensation. 
Corrective justice operates on moral wrongdoing, not wrongdoing in a 
technical legal sense. The moral character of the wrongdoing provides the 
principled justification for imposing liability on the wrongdoer. So, the 
“wrongful losses” corrective justice is concerned with are wrongful in the 
sense that they are inconsistent with the plaintiff’s moral obligations towards 
the defendant. By breaching those obligations, the defendant incurs a moral 
obligation to put right the loss he or she has caused. Legal liability recognises 
that moral obligation and allows it to be enforced thereby ensuring that 
corrective justice is done. The pursuit of corrective justice thus presupposes a 
normative account of what kind of losses that occur in the context of 
interactions between individuals are wrongful and generate such a moral 
obligation.6 
In relation to injured persons, corrective justice only provides an account of 
what ought to happen when a person suffers a loss due to an injury that was 
wrongfully inflicted by another person. A remedy involving a transfer from a 
defendant to a plaintiff may resemble corrective justice in form, but is not 
                                                          
4 In other contexts, corrective justice can be concerned with gain. See, for example, the 
discussion of unjust enrichment in cases of mistaken payments in Lionel Smith “Restitution: 
the Heart of Corrective Justice” (2001) 79 Tex L Rev 2115 at 2132–2135. That said, in the 
context of personal injury, corrective justice is concerned with loss and harm, not gain. 
5 Ernest J Weinrib “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 UTLJ 349 at 349. 
6 For example, Weinrib argues that the normative content of corrective justice is provided by 
Kantian Right. See Ernest Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995) at 84. 
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necessarily justified by corrective justice unless the principled basis for the 
transfer is that the defendant is performing their moral obligation to correct a 
wrongful loss caused to the plaintiff. For example, making a particular 
defendant responsible for a loss because that defendant is better able to absorb 
the loss than the plaintiff results in a transaction between two parties but it is 
not justified by corrective justice. 
2. Retributive justice 
Like corrective justice, retributive justice is concerned with moral wrongdoing. 
However, while corrective justice is concerned with rectifying the 
consequences of wrongdoing between individuals, retributive justice is 
concerned with providing society’s response to wrongdoing. The moral 
character of the wrongdoing provides the principled basis for providing 
society’s response, by way of punishment, deterrence and denunciation. 
The performance of retributive justice therefore requires an account of 
what kind of acts are moral wrongdoing deserving of a retributive response, 
and an account of how to determine what response is appropriate for a 
particular act of wrongdoing. 
Although corrective justice and retributive justice are both concerned with 
moral wrongdoing, their subject matter does not necessarily exactly coincide. 
The moral wrongdoing relevant to corrective justice is wrongdoing that 
generates an obligation to put right harm caused. The moral wrongdoing of 
retributive justice is wrongdoing that ought to receive a response from society 
in terms of punishment, deterrence and denunciation. 
3. Distributive justice 
Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of a benefit or burden 
across society and is typically pursued by machinery that achieves the 
particular desired distribution across society. For example, a progressive 
taxation system seeks to achieve a certain distribution of wealth.  
Compensation is a benefit to the injury victim, which serves the purpose of 
alleviating the victim of some or the entire burden of injury. Approaching 
injury as a matter of distributive justice therefore means taking the view that 
justice for victims of injury is measured with reference to how the burden of 
injury is shared across society. There are two interconnected elements to this. 
The first concerns the extent to which an individual injury sufferer is alleviated 
of the burden of the injury, and the second concerning how that burden is then 
distributed across society. 
Just as corrective justice requires a normative account of which losses are 
wrongful, assessing the justice of the distribution of a particular benefit or 
burden requires a criterion that sets out what a just distribution is. Strictly 
speaking, any distribution of a benefit or burden across society in accordance 
with some criterion for distribution can be said to be in accordance with 
distributive justice. Distribution of the cost of accidents based on an arbitrary 
criterion like skin colour is in a theoretical sense distributive justice. 
Realistically, of course, a modern society is likely to adopt a criterion for the 
distribution of the cost of accidents based on various competing considerations 
such as affordability, providing for victims of injury and rehabilitation. There 
is, of course, room for disagreement over what is a fair way to distribute the 
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cost of accidents without adopting an arbitrary criterion, and on this there are a 
range of differing views reflecting a broad political spectrum. 
4. These conceptions of justice can conflict 
An injury caused by wrongdoing can fall within the subject matter of 
corrective justice, distributive justice and retributive justice. The three 
conceptions of justice provide different accounts of a just outcome following 
wrongfully inflicted injury: 
• A just outcome in terms of corrective justice is when the wrongdoer puts 
right the loss caused by the injury; 
• A just outcome in terms of distributive justice is when the victim is 
alleviated of some of the burden of their injury, based on the consistent 
application of the same criterion for alleviation of burden applied to all 
victims of injury; and 
• Retributive justice is achieved by providing a response appropriate for the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing, for which the victim’s loss may be relevant 
but is not determinative. 
It is not generally possible to satisfy all three conceptions of justice in a 
single legal response. Corrective justice is achieved only if the loss is put right, 
so is not satisfied with a less than complete alleviation of the burden of injury 
that might satisfy distributive justice or retributive justice. Even if a 
distributive justice system were to alleviate the entire burden, corrective justice 
would not be satisfied because a broad re-distributive scheme does not effect 
justice as between the doer and sufferer of harm. Distributive justice is not 
satisfied if some injury victims are treated differently than others because they 
happen to have been injured by wrongdoing, and determining wrongdoing 
consumes resources that cannot be redistributed to injury victims. Retributive 
justice is unlikely to be served by distributive justice machinery focused on 
shifting the burden from the victim of wrongdoing. Retributive justice will 
only coincide with corrective justice if the wrongdoer putting right any losses 
he or she has inflicted on another party also satisfies the desire for punishment 
and deterrence. 
This raises the dilemma of whether one particular conception of justice 
should dictate the outcome for wrongdoer and victim following an injury 
caused by wrongdoing, and if not, how to determine the outcome. 
Each conception of justice has some political value, in the sense that 
society values the pursuit and achievement of “justice” as described by each 
conception of justice.  
The questions of which distributive justice criterion we ought to adopt, and 
which conception of justice ought to prevail when there is a conflict are not 
questions we can answer with logic. These are political questions that should 
be addressed through the democratic process. As will be seen, the answers to 
these questions have changed over time.  
C. Justice for Injury Victims Before ACC 
The common law position before the development of negligence as an 
independent tort strongly resembles a system of compensation for injury based 
on corrective justice. A plaintiff could only receive compensation by showing 
that a defendant had intentionally interfered with a protected interest of the 
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plaintiff, a high threshold that can be equated with moral wrongdoing. If 
successful, a plaintiff’s remedy was an award of damages intended to address 
their loss. 
This illustrates a distinction between corrective justice and distributive 
justice. A system of compensation for injury based on corrective justice is not 
the same thing as a system of compensation that distributes the cost of 
accidents across society based on fault. Corrective justice only operates on 
wrongful losses inflicted by one person on another, and achieves justice by 
way of a transaction between doer and sufferer of harm. This means that 
corrective justice provides nothing for the “innocent injured” who suffers a 
loss due to no fault or wrongdoing of his or her own. In contrast, a distributive 
justice system that distributes the cost of injury across society based on fault 
must address such an innocent injured, because the criterion of fault does not 
justify the cost of an accident falling on a faultless victim. 
The pre-negligence common law failed to compensate a great many injury 
victims, so it was unsatisfactory in terms of distributive justice.7 The 
development of negligence as an independent tort, and the various statutory 
schemes that supplemented it were a reaction to this unjust distribution of the 
cost of accidents. This occurred in the context of an increasing number of 
injuries due to social progress, and a growing departure from the idea that 
injury was a private matter between injurer and victim. That is, society was 
increasingly seeking to achieve distributive justice for victims of injury. 
The introduction and expansion of the tort of negligence allowed the 
common law to provide compensation to an increasing proportion of injury 
victims, at the cost of its corrective justice credentials. The objective standard 
of care meant that defendants could be held responsible for inadvertent acts or 
omissions which can be challenging to describe as moral wrongdoing. The 
objective test also meant that a defendant could be held liable for a standard he 
or she might be personally incapable of meeting. Vicarious liability and a 
wider approach to proximity in contrast with the direct link between act and 
injury required for intentional torts meant that defendants could be held 
responsible for acts that occurred outside the context of any immediate 
interaction of plaintiff and defendant. Liability insurance mitigated the effect 
of a damages award on the defendant, so allayed any concerns that negligence 
liability was unfairly penalising a morally innocent defendant. These 
developments brought the tort of negligence to a point where the notion of 
corrective justice could not provide a strong principled basis for the existence 
of the action.8 
However, distributive justice could not provide the principled basis for the 
tort of negligence either, because the action still fell far short of actually 
                                                          
7 As long as one’s conception of a just distribution of compensation demanded more than a 
lottery.  
8 I must acknowledge the view that negligence was based on corrective justice and the 
developments I have discussed are consistent with corrective justice and should not be seen 
as a move towards the pursuit of distributive justice through tort law. See Allan Beever 
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart, Oxford, 2007). Even if it is not the case that the 
development of the independent tort of negligence brought the action to the point where it 
could not be justified in principle by corrective justice, the more important point here is that 
negligence was unsatisfactory in terms of distributive justice, and this led to ACC. 
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achieving a consistent distribution of the cost of accidents across society. The 
ability of negligence to achieve distributive justice was constrained by two 
features of the action. First, the requirement to prove fault meant that the 
negligence action could not reach all injury victims, even though negligence 
was easier to establish than moral wrongdoing. Second, the tort of negligence 
was clumsy and inefficient at spreading the burden of injury. The form of the 
action only allowed a transfer of burden from one individual defendant to one 
individual plaintiff, although vicarious liability and liability insurance meant 
that the burden could be spread further. While the development of the 
independent tort of negligence was driven by a desire to provide better 
outcomes for victims of injury, distributive justice did not provide a strong 
principled basis for the tort, because it was still poor at actually delivering 
better outcomes for victims. 
D. A Brief History of ACC 
The ACC scheme was introduced to address the position outlined above: 
society was increasingly demanding distributive justice for victims of injury, 
but the existing measures to assist victims of injury fell well short. As well as 
the civil law, injury victims could receive compensation from private 
insurance, and various statutory schemes: Social Security the Workers’ 
Compensation Scheme, and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. Each 
of these schemes had significant limitations. Social Security was intended as a 
safety-net and provided means-tested assistance with basic needs rather than 
compensating actual losses.9 Workers’ Compensation, in theory, paid 
compensation to workers injured at work at a level of eighty per cent of lost 
earnings.10 However, that compensation was subject to a statutory maximum 
that was not inflation adjusted and most workers received far less than eighty 
per cent of their lost earnings. The Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme 
provided compensation to injured victims of crime for lost earnings on a 
similar basis to Workers’ Compensation.11 That scheme also provided, on a 
similar basis to the common law, awards for pecuniary loss other than that 
caused by incapacity to work, and compensation for pain and suffering. Unlike 
the common law, these awards were subject to a statutory maximum. The 
scope of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme was limited, since it 
could only assist injured victims of crime. 
A Royal Commission of Inquiry was formed to consider how to improve 
this position. The resulting report,12 usually known as the “Woodhouse 
Report” after its chairman Sir Owen Woodhouse, provided a cutting criticism 
of the status quo and a revolutionary vision of an alternative. 
The Report’s criticism of the status quo was twofold. Firstly, it criticised 
the manifestly unfair distribution of the burden of accidents. Secondly, it 
                                                          
9 Social Security Act 1938. 
10 Workers’ Compensation Act 1956. 
11 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963. 
12 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for personal injury in New Zealand; Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry (Government Printer, Wellington, 1967). 
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argued that the negligence action had departed from its own fault principle, 
that principle being in any case the wrong one to determine where the burden 
of accidents should fall. From the outset, it was clear that the Report 
approached the question of what is a just distribution of the cost of accidents in 
terms of distributive justice, and took the view that meeting the needs of 
accident victims trumped the pursuit of corrective justice, retributive justice or 
other goals. This allowed the Report to provide a coherent principled basis for 
its alternative proposal: to replace all the existing measures of compensation 
with a comprehensive scheme available to all victims of injury, which paid 
compensation based on actual losses. 
The ACC scheme commenced operation on 1 April 1974, after the 
Accident Compensation Act 1972 (“the 1972 Act”) came into force. The Act 
provided cover for “personal injury by accident” which was not exhaustively 
defined.13 Entitlements payable included compensation for lost earnings, based 
on eighty per cent of pre-injury earnings, treatment, rehabilitation, and lump 
sum compensation for permanent impairment and mental suffering. The statute 
barred proceedings arising “directly or indirectly” for personal injury by 
accident covered by the scheme.14 
The scheme has had numerous statutory revisions over the years, including 
changes to almost every aspect of the scheme, from its funding to the scope of 
cover and the detail of entitlements. The most significant changes for present 
purposes came with the Accident Rehabilitation Compensation and Insurance 
Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”). Following New Zealand’s general election in 1990, 
a new right-wing government came into power. The 1992 Act was a response 
to public perceptions that the scheme had become expensive, and that the 
courts had expanded cover of the scheme too far. The statutory language of the 
1992 Act was prescriptive, in contrast to the original legislation which allowed 
a lot more room for discretion. The 1992 Act was less generous both in terms 
of the scope of what the scheme covered, and what entitlement were payable. 
Lump sum compensation for permanent impairment was replaced by periodic 
payments at a much less generous rate, and lump sum compensation for pain 
and suffering was done away with entirely. 
Underlying the Act, and hinted at by the reference to “insurance” in its 
title, was a different philosophy of the scheme. The essence of an insurance 
contract is the transfer of a risk from the insured to the insurer, in exchange for 
a payment which reflects that risk. The scheme can be seen as the state 
providing accident insurance to each individual in the community. This then 
raises the question of whether each individual is making a fair contribution to 
the funding of the scheme for the value of the insurance that they receive. In 
changing the funding of the scheme, the government responded to employers 
who had argued that it was unfair that they provided nearly 70 per cent of all 
payments into the scheme when less than 40 per cent of payments related to 
work accidents. This kind of objection is alien to the thinking of the 
Woodhouse Commission which saw the scheme as the community taking 
responsibility for its injured citizens, not as a series of insurance policies to 
                                                          
13 Accident Compensation Act 1972, s 2. 
14 Accident Compensation Act 1972, s 5(1). 
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individuals. The right-wing take on the ACC scheme was taken even further by 
the Accident Insurance Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”), which partially privatised 
the scheme. The period of privatisation was short-lived though, since the left 
came back into power in 1999 and almost immediately re-nationalised the 
scheme.15 
The left then provided a new principal Act: the Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001(“the 2001 Act”).16 The purpose of 
the 2001 Act set out at section 3 is to: 
[E]nhance the public good and reinforce the social contract represented by the first 
accident compensation scheme by providing for a fair and sustainable scheme for 
managing personal injury that has, as its overriding goals, minimising both the 
overall incidence of injury in the community, and the impact of injury on the 
community (including economic, social, and personal costs). 
The reference to the social contract underpinning the first accident 
compensation scheme, and the removal of any reference to “insurance” in its 
title, suggested that the 2001 Act would herald a return to the original scheme 
rather than the more miserly insurance-based 1992 Act version, and in many 
ways it did. Lump sums were returned as the means of compensating for 
permanent impairment. The 2001 Act also placed greater emphasis on 
rehabilitation and injury prevention as functions of the scheme. 
However, the 2001 Act retained a number of the more restrictive features 
of the 1992 Act. The structure of the 2001 Act resembles the 1992 and 1998 
Acts rather than the original legislation. The 2001 Act retained the more 
narrow prescriptive definition of cover. Although lump sum compensation was 
re-introduced, lump sum compensation for pain and suffering was not. If the 
original scheme was overly generous, and the 1992 scheme was overly 
concerned with cost, the reference to a “fair and sustainable” scheme in the 
purpose section perhaps suggests that the 2001 Act was intended to achieve a 
balance between the two. 
E. The Justice of Compensation 
Compensation is the primary function of the civil law, and can serve both 
distributive justice (in terms of achieving the desired distribution of the burden 
of accidents) and corrective justice (in terms of a defendant correcting a 
wrongful loss). The ACC scheme serves distributive justice for all injury 
victims. However, the bar on proceedings for personal injury means that the 
civil law cannot serve corrective justice for injury victims.17  
                                                          
15 Accident Insurance Amendment Act 2000 and Accident Insurance (Transitional Provisions) 
Act 2000. 
16 Following the Accident Compensation Amendment Act 2010, the 2001 Act is now the 
“Accident Compensation Act 2001”. 
17 “Corrective justice has a value, of course . . . The position is simply this: if the [ACC] 
scheme is adopted, then corrective justice will no longer be realized and that will have a 
disvalue” Allan Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 
28 OJLS 475 at 499. 
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Sir Geoffrey Palmer wrote in 1994 that the ACC scheme represented a 
decision to sacrifice corrective justice for distributive justice and declared:18 
The principle that people who suffer personal injury from the culpable behaviour of 
another ought to have a remedy in the courts is not the law of New Zealand. The 
corrective-justice analysis that an individual whose autonomy has been invaded 
ought to have it restored and paid for by the person who caused it holds no sway. 
There is no community expectation that the restoration needs to be carried out by 
the person who inflicted the injury, or that anything is to be gained socially by 
compelling those who cause personal injury to provide redress in damages to their 
victims… 
[Corrective justice] lacks real power in the minds of people. They are interested in 
recompense and compensation for their injuries. They are interested in the amount 
of compensation and whether it compares with what they have lost. The source of 
the compensation is of secondary concern. The fact that the wrongdoer does not pay 
excites few. People who do wrong will be punished by the criminal law. 
Parliament’s responses to the introduction of the ACC scheme suggest that 
this assertion that corrective justice lacks power in New Zealand is quite 
wrong. Corrective justice for injury victims may have been expunged from the 
civil law but has been resurrected in the criminal law. By 1994, the criminal 
law’s compensatory function had already been expanded with the introduction 
of the sentence of reparation, a payment from the offender to the victim which 
a court was required to award unless it was inappropriate to do so.19 Later, the 
Sentencing Act 2002 introduced a stronger presumption in favour of 
reparation20 and allowed for awards of reparation for a greater range of 
losses.21 
Clearly, Parliament is responding to a public demand for corrective justice, 
evidenced by the results of the citizens-initiated22 justice referendum in 199923 
                                                          
18 Geoffrey Palmer “New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years On” 
(1994) 44 UTLJ 223 at 247–253. 
19 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22 introduced the sentence of reparation, which originally was 
only available for damage to property and did not extend to consequential losses. Section 11 
stated that a sentencing Court was required to impose a sentence of reparation unless it was 
satisfied that it was inappropriate to do so. Reparation for emotional harm, which was 
available in cases of injury, was introduced in 1987. 
20 Sentencing Act 2002 under s 12 a sentencing court must impose a sentence of reparation 
unless it is satisfied that the sentence would result in undue hardship for the offender or the 
dependants of the offender, or that any other special circumstances would make it 
inappropriate. Further, s 12(3) requires a court which does not award reparation to give 
reasons for doing so. 
21 Sentencing Act 2002, s 32(1)(c) allows for reparation for “loss or damage consequential on 
any emotional or physical harm or loss of, or damage to, property”. 
22 The Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 allows for a non-binding referendum to be held if 
proponents submit a petition to Parliament signed by 10 per cent of all registered electors, 
collected within 12 months. 
23 A citizens initiated referendum held alongside the 1999 election asked “Should there be a 
reform of our justice system placing greater emphasis on the needs of victims, providing 
restitution and compensation for them and imposing minimum sentences and hard labour for 
all serious violent offences?” 92 per cent voted “Yes”, with an 83 per cent turnout. Electoral 
Commission “1999 General Election – Return of Citizens Initiated Referenda Poll Votes – 
Reform of the Criminal Justice System” (1999) Electoral Commission website 
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and submissions to the 2007 Inquiry into Victims Rights.24 The tort of 
negligence was not valued for delivering corrective justice because, as the 
Woodhouse Commission observed, the “fault” of negligence could not be 
equated with moral wrongdoing. However, it does not follow that New 
Zealand had no great fondness for corrective justice, only that New Zealand 
had no great fondness for the tort of negligence.25 
If the introduction of the ACC scheme was a decision to sacrifice 
corrective justice for distributive justice, then later decisions to increase the 
compensatory role of the criminal law came at the expense of sacrificing the 
Woodhouse Commission’s conception of distributive justice in the sense of 
consistent treatment of all victims of injury. Making compensation the first 
function of criminal sentencing also means a sacrifice of retributive justice, 
since some offenders may be ordered to pay a quantum of reparation that does 
not reflect their personal culpability. 
Like compensatory damages in the civil law, awards of reparation in the 
criminal law can serve distributive justice as well as corrective justice.26 Like 
the tort of negligence did with victims of injury, reparation provides 
inconsistent outcomes to victims: not all crimes result in a conviction, and not 
all convicted offenders can pay. Even after the stronger presumption in favour 
of reparation introduced in the Sentencing Act 2002, reparation was not often 
awarded,27 the most common reason being that the offender was unable to 
pay.28 Like the tort of negligence, these inconsistent outcomes resulted in a 
legislative response: the offender levy scheme.  
The offender levy scheme was introduced by an amendment to the 
Sentencing Act 2002.29 The scheme collects revenue by applying a levy of $50 
to all offenders, and the funds are used to provide various services to victims 
approved by the Secretary for Justice. Thus far, the government has chosen to 
                                                                                                                               
<http://electionresults.org.nz/electionresults_1999/e9/html/e9_partXIV.html>. The election 
itself had a turnout of 85 per cent. 
24 Justice and Electoral Committee Inquiry into Victims’ Rights (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 2007) at 5, which found that “the system appears to be focused heavily upon the 
needs of prosecutorial agencies and defence counsel, and too often victims’ rights are 
considered only as an afterthought” and recommended various changes including “the 
establishment of a compensation regime which focuses on recompensing victims for their 
loss.” 
25 Even among lawyers there was no united support for the fault principle of negligence. The 
New Zealand Law Society’s submission to the Royal Commission noted a diversity of views 
and stated that the Society could not express a view embracing the whole of the profession. 
See Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 
1979) at 89. 
26 Compensating victims of crime can be seen as an end in itself as well as a way of achieving 
corrective justice. Like awards of compensatory damages to injury victims, reparation can be 
seen in terms of alleviating victims of crime of a burden. 
27 In 2008, only fifteen per cent of the approximately 120,000 sentences imposed involved 
reparation see Ministry of Justice Initial Briefing to the Justice and Electoral Committee on 
the Sentencing (Offender Levy) Amendment Bill (2009). 
28 Ministry of Justice The Sentencing Act 2002: Monitoring the First Year (Wellington, 2004) 
at 30. 
29 Sentencing (Offender Levy) Amendment Act 2009. 
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focus the funding on victims of serious crime,30 so the offender levy assists 
only a small subset of victims of crime. 
One of the services funded by the offender levy scheme is funeral grant 
top-ups to families of victims of homicide. The families of victims of accidents 
are entitled to a grant from ACC to assist with funeral costs, and the families 
of victims of homicide (which is covered under the scheme) receive an extra 
grant. 
Although the services to victims provided by the offender levy scheme are 
funded by offenders, the scheme cannot draw on corrective justice as a 
justification. The same levy of $50 is applied to all offenders regardless of the 
level of harm caused, or if any harm is caused at all. For offences with no 
readily available “victim” who has suffered harm, corrective justice cannot 
provide a justification for the levy. It could be argued that “victimless” 
offences such as drug use cause harm to society at large, but this still cannot 
justify the offender levy, since the levy is used to fund services in respect of 
offences that do have victims, not victimless crimes. Finally, the levy provides 
services only to victims who happen to qualify for the services that the 
Secretary for Justice happens to have decided to provide. This means that some 
offenders who have harmed the victim of their crime will pay the levy, but the 
levy will go towards correcting harm caused to different victims of other 
crimes. 
The previous legislative response to inconsistent outcomes for victims of 
crime was the criminal injuries compensation scheme, which ran for around 
ten years concurrently with the law of tort until it was abolished following the 
introduction of the ACC scheme.31 In 2009, over thirty years later, a new 
scheme to address the inconsistent compensation to victims of crime was 
introduced. The existence of both schemes suggests that there is some political 
will for injured victims of crime to receive assistance from the state in addition 
to that received by other injury victims. It is difficult to justify in principle why 
some victims of injury should receive more assistance than others because they 
happen to have been victims of crime.32 Corrective justice can provide no 
justification for the criminal injuries compensation scheme – so we are left in 
the somewhat uneasy position where political will has lead legislators to 
establish a scheme with no clearly principled basis. 
I suggest that we can conclude that the principle that people who suffer 
personal injury from the culpable behaviour of another ought to have a remedy 
in the courts has not fallen out of favour, nor has it been completely abandoned 
in favour of the distributive justice of ACC. Instead, it has found a new home 
in the criminal law. 
                                                          
30 Ministry of Justice “Additional support for victims of serious crime” (2011) Ministry of 
Justice website <http://justice.govt.nz/policy/supporting-victims/new-entitlements-and-
services-for-victims-of-serious-crime/>. 
31 Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1974. 
32 See New Zealand Law Commission Compensating Crime Victims (NZLC IP11, 2008) at 324, 
Peter Duff “The Measure of Criminal Injuries Compensation: Political Pragmatism or Dog’s 
Dinner?” (1998) 18(1) OJLS 105 and Andrew Ashworth “Punishment and Compensation: 
Victims, Offenders and the State” (1986) 6 OJLS 86. 
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F. Response to Wrongdoing after ACC 
Although compensation may be the primary function of the civil law, the law 
of torts is concerned to some extent with responding to wrongdoing: punishing 
wrongdoers, deterring wrongful conduct, marking society’s disapproval and so 
on. The civil law performed this function in relation to wrongdoing which 
caused injury in a number of different ways. Compensatory damages could 
provide punishment and deterrence as well as compensation. Nominal 
damages, awarded as of right for trespass, recognise a breach of a common law 
right even if no actual damage was caused, thereby vindicating the right. 
Aggravated damages allowed the law to respond to particularly high-handed 
breaches of rights. The power to make a declaration provided the courts with 
an additional means of recognising a wrong. Exemplary damages allowed the 
law to respond to outrageous conduct. 
The introduction of the ACC scheme and the statutory bar on proceedings 
for damages arising directly or indirectly from a covered injury means that 
compensatory damages can no longer provide these retributive functions in 
relation to conduct that causes injury. This has led to the criminal law 
becoming more concerned with wrongdoing that might previously have been 
dealt with by the civil law and caused ongoing pressure on the civil law. Let us 
consider how three particular types of wrongdoing have fared since the 
introduction of the scheme: advertent wrongdoing, inadvertent wrongdoing 
and state wrongdoing. 
1. Advertent wrongdoing 
Prior to ACC, the civil law could provide a response by awards of damages in 
relation to advertent wrongdoing – in relation to both acts deliberately intended 
to cause harm, and acts performed with the conscious knowledge that harm 
might follow. If an award of compensatory damages was not a sufficient 
response to the advertent wrongdoing in question, then additional awards could 
be made of aggravated and exemplary damages.33 
Following G v Auckland Hospital Board,34 which found that a rape was an 
“accident” in terms of the 1972 Act, it is clear that advertent acts that cause 
personal injury fall under the ACC scheme and thus attract the statutory bar on 
proceedings for compensation.  
In Donselaar v Donselaar,35 the Court of Appeal found that while 
compensatory and aggravated damages were barred for injury victims 
following the introduction of the ACC scheme, exemplary damages could be 
awarded to fulfil the traditional function of exemplary damages: punishing 
outrageous wrongdoing. Thus, the civil law can still respond to advertent 
wrongdoing by awards of exemplary damages in cases where the conduct is 
sufficiently outrageous that a court determines that a punitive award is 
appropriate. The civil law thus has a post-ACC role in responding to advertent 
                                                          
33 Aggravated damages to compensate the victim because of the advertent aspect of the 
wrongdoing and exemplary damages to punish the wrongdoer. 
34 G v Auckland Hospital Board [1976] 1 NZLR 638 (HC). 
35 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA). 
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wrongdoing, albeit a more limited one since the civil law can only reach 
injury-causing advertent wrongdoing if it is outrageous. 
2. Inadvertent wrongdoing 
Prior to ACC, work and motor vehicle injuries were often addressed through 
the civil law and not the criminal law: an award of damages was sufficient to 
both compensate the victim and punish and deter the wrongdoer, so the 
criminal law did not need to be involved. The kind of “wrongdoing” in such 
cases was usually wrongdoing in the sense of an inadvertent departure from 
the community standard for workplace safety or safe driving – as opposed to 
the kind of advertent moral wrongdoing normally associated with the criminal 
law. As well as responding to individual wrongdoing, the civil law also played 
a role in setting community standards through the objective standard of 
negligence in combination with the tort of breach of statutory duty and various 
industrial statutes. 
Since the introduction of the ACC scheme, the civil law can no longer 
address inadvertent wrongdoing that leads to personal injury by awards of 
compensatory damages. Following McLaren Transport v Somerville in 1996,36 
it appeared that the civil law could continue to address inadvertent wrongdoing 
by awards of exemplary damages in cases where the inadvertent conduct was 
outrageous enough to deserve a punitive response. However, the New Zealand 
courts came to take a more conservative approach to exemplary damages. 
In Bottrill,37 the majority of the Court of Appeal found that exemplary 
damages should be restricted to advertent wrongdoing, and in Daniels v 
Thompson38 the majority of the Court of Appeal thought that in matters of 
punishment the civil law should defer to the criminal law. Although the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Bottrill was overturned by the Privy Council,39 it was 
restored by a majority of the Supreme Court in Couch v Attorney-General.40 
Exemplary damages are now not available to address inadvertent wrongdoing. 
The function of responding to inadvertent wrongdoing, at least in cases of 
industrial and motor vehicle injury, has now shifted to the criminal law. 
Breaches of workplace safety standards are addressed by the Health and Safety 
in Employment (HSE) Act 1992 which, like the tort of negligence, assesses the 
employer’s conduct against an objective standard.41 Similarly, various motor 
vehicle offences penalise departure from an objective standard of driving.42 As 
Thomas J observed, “[t]here are few aspects of a citizen’s conduct today which 
may not constitute a crime or a quasi-crime or a breach of a regulatory 
                                                          
36 McLaren Transport Ltd v Somerville [1996] 3 NZLR 424 (HC). 
37 Bottrill v A [2001] 3 NZLR 622 (CA). 
38 Daniels v Thompson, [1998] 3 NZLR 22 (CA), see below page 34 at “H. Assessing the 
Performance of Parliament”. 
39 Bottrill v A [2002] UKPC 44, [2003] 2 NZLR 721. 
40 Couch v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149. 
41 The Health and Safety Act 1992 imposes various obligations on employers, primarily an 
obligation at s 6 to take “all practicable steps to ensure the safety of employees while at 
work”. 
42 For example Land Transport Act 1998, s 8 imposes a duty on drivers not to be careless. 
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provision.”43 This is in part because of the ACC scheme: since compensatory 
damages cannot address inadvertent conduct causing injury, for it to be 
addressed at all it must be addressed by another means. 
3. State wrongdoing 
In the case of industrial and vehicular injuries, the decreased capacity of the 
civil law has been matched by an increased capacity of the criminal law to deal 
with inadvertent conduct. However, there is no equivalent legislation for state 
wrongdoing. Victims of injury caused by improper but inadvertent action by 
the state who want the state’s wrongdoing addressed and publicly condemned 
must turn to the civil law. The predictable result, as Hammond J observed in 
Hobson v Attorney-General,44 is that “blisters are forming at various points on 
the skin of the New Zealand polity, with increasing numbers of claims against 
the Crown for tortious redress, in one context or another.” 
The ability of the civil law to respond to wrongdoing that leads to injury is 
much reduced following the introduction of ACC. Compensatory damages are 
prohibited by the statutory bar on proceedings, and the courts have found that 
the bar extends to nominal45 and aggravated46 damages. In Simpson v Attorney-
General,47 the Court of Appeal found that public law damages could be 
awarded to address breaches of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) rights, and in Wilding v Attorney-General48 the Court of Appeal 
found that public law damages could be awarded in cases of injury, as long as 
they served the purpose of addressing the breach and not compensating for 
injury. Public law damages can address breaches of NZBORA, but not 
common law rights that have no parallel in NZBORA. Declarations are only 
available at the discretion of the court. 
The law is lacking a clear avenue to address inadvertent wrongdoing by 
state bodies that leads to injury – the kind of injuries that result from systemic 
neglect or oversight rather than a specifiable act or omission by an individual 
officer advertently taking a risk. Under the Ombudsmen Act 1975, an 
Ombudsman can investigate administrative acts, decisions or 
recommendations,49 but this does not easily encompass the issue of systemic 
fault causing injury. 
The facts of the Couch case illustrate the problem here. In 1997, Mr 
William Bell was sentenced to imprisonment following his conviction for the 
aggravated robbery of a service station. He was released in 2001 under a 
number of conditions relating to supervision by his probation officer. He was 
first placed under the supervision of a senior probation officer, but shortly 
afterwards his supervision was passed to a newly appointed probation officer. 
                                                          
43 Daniels v Thompson, above n 38, at 19. 
44 Hobson v Attorney-General [2007] 1 NZLR 374 (CA) at [75]. 
45 Re Chase [1989] 1 NZLR 325 (CA). 
46 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA). 
47 Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
48 Wilding v Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR 787 (CA). 
49 Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 13(1). 
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While under the supervision of his new probation officer, and allegedly with 
her knowledge, Mr Bell was accepted into a liquor licensing course. Part of the 
course involved working at the Mt Wellington-Panmure Returned and 
Services’ Association (“RSA”) Club. In 2003, Mr Bell robbed the Mt-
Wellington-Panmure RSA Club. During the robbery, he bludgeoned four 
people with a shotgun, and shot one in the chest. Three of the victims died, and 
Ms Couch survived with serious injuries. 
Ms Couch brought proceedings in negligence against the Department of 
Corrections, arguing that the Department had a duty to warn staff at the Mt 
Wellington-Panmure RSA, and had failed in its duty to supervise Bell. A 
majority of the Court of Appeal struck out her negligence claim on the basis 
that there was no prospect of establishing such a duty on the part of the 
Department.50 
The Supreme Court found that the striking out of the claim was premature; 
that a finding that the Department owed a duty of care to Ms Couch had been 
ruled out too early.51 If such a duty was recognised, then Ms Couch’s injuries 
could potentially be regarded as resulting from a breach of that duty due to 
systemic negligence – as opposed to advertent wrongdoing – on the part of the 
Department of Corrections. However, the only way to address that negligence 
would be an award of exemplary damages. A majority of the Supreme Court 
later found that exemplary damages are available in negligence actions only in 
cases of advertent and outrageous carelessness.52 So, the civil law provides no 
response if the Department was negligent but not advertently and outrageously 
so. 
The legislation available to protect against inadvertent wrongdoing is not of 
assistance here. If Ms Couch had been an employee of the Department of 
Corrections then her injuries arguably could be regarded as resulting from a 
failure by the Department to take all practicable steps to ensure her safety 
while at work.53 In that case the Department would have committed an offence 
against the HSE Act 1992 – with no need to prove advertence or 
outrageousness. The HSE Act 1992 also imposes a duty on employers in 
relation to third parties: to “take all practicable steps to ensure that no action or 
inaction of any employee while at work harms any other person”54 However, 
since the duty relates to specific actions or inactions by individual employees it 
does not readily apply to cases of systemic negligence. 
Some judges have explored the possibility of expanding exemplary 
damages to bolster the civil law’s ability to address inadvertent systemic 
wrongdoing. This view was hinted at by Cooke J in Donselaar v Donselaar,55 
and taken up in minority judgments by Thomas J in Bottrill56 and later Daniels 
                                                          
50 Hobson v Attorney-General [2007] 1 NZLR 374 (CA). 
51 Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725. 
52 Couch v Attorney-General, above n 40. 
53 HSE Act 1992, s 6, an employer is under a duty to “take all practicable steps to ensure the 
safety of employees while at work”. 
54 HSE Act 1992, s 15. 
55 Donselaar v Donselaar, above n 35, at 107. 
56 Bottrill v A [2001] 3 NZLR 622 (CA). 
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v Thompson,57 and most recently by Elias CJ in her dissent in Couch.58 
Developing exemplary damages to serve that purpose would mean a 
fundamental change to the kind of conduct that exemplary damages typically 
addressed and would attract traditional criticisms of exemplary damages 
relating to punishment in the civil law and the anomaly of the windfall to the 
plaintiff. Despite a strong dissent from the Chief Justice, the majority of the 
Supreme Court has put a stop to this line of thought, for the moment at least.59 
The anomalies of exemplary damages could possibly be avoided if, like 
inadvertent conduct by employers or motorists that leads to injury, inadvertent 
conduct by state bodies that falls below a reasonable standard of care and 
concern for affected citizens was brought within the reach of the criminal law. 
A sentence of a fine might provide punishment, deterrence and condemnation 
for state fault leading to injury, while avoiding the anomaly of the entire 
exemplary damages award going to the plaintiff.60 Reparation for emotional 
harm would essentially perform the function of aggravated damages. The 
concern that a criminal offence for inadvertent state conduct leading to injury 
might lead to an over-cautious and counter-productive approach by state 
officers is a fair one but could be addressed. If the focus is on systemic rather 
than individual fault, then the offence could be committed only by state 
entities. The wording of any such offence would of course be important, and 
the HSE Act 1992 could potentially provide a model: a duty could for example 
be imposed on a state entity to take “all practicable steps to ensure the safety of 
citizens affected by its activities” or “all practicable steps to ensure that no 
action or inaction by the entity or any of its officers causes harm to any other 
person.” When interpreting the offence, the courts could give weight to the 
same kinds of policy considerations that come into play when assessing the 
scope of a duty of care in the civil law.61 The meaning of “all practicable 
steps”, like the concepts of duty of care and reasonable care in negligence law, 
has room for flexibility. This could allow the courts to develop the offence in 
such a way to address systemic inadvertent conduct without making the state 
too over-cautious. 
However, as with expanding exemplary damages, there are significant 
problems with this approach. It is questionable whether it makes any sense to 
punish a state entity, and even more questionable whether a fine can have any 
deterrent effect since the result is essentially a transfer from one column of the 
state’s account-book to another. Although a finding that a state entity has 
committed an offence might allow for condemnation, this purpose alone may 
                                                          
57 Daniels v Thompson, above n 38. 
58 Couch v Attorney-General, above n 40. 
59 When the judiciary took a restrictive position on exemplary damages in Daniels v Thompson, 
above n 38, it was rejected by the legislature, see below at 34 “H. Assessing the Performance 
of Parliament” – we have yet to see whether Couch, above n 40, provokes a legislative 
response. 
60 Indeed, in Couch above n 40, at [258] Wilson J mused that if exemplary damages were being 
newly introduced, there is an argument that the award should be paid to the state, like a fine. 
61 Which include the policy consideration that extending a duty of care too far may lead to over-
cautiousness. See for example Hobson v Attorney-General, above n 44, at [122]. 
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be insufficient to justify the expense of a trial if there is no effective 
punishment or deterrent. 
With respect to systemic fault, any proceeding that focuses on an individual 
case is limited in terms of the light it can shed on problems with the system, 
whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. One response in New Zealand to 
concerns of systemic fault is to hold an inquiry of some sort. Two such 
inquiries being currently conducted are the Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy62 and the Royal Commission of Inquiry 
into Building Failure Caused by the Canterbury Earthquakes.63 The ACC 
scheme arose out of the Woodhouse Report which was the culmination of such 
an inquiry. Perhaps then, rather than relying on civil or criminal proceedings 
brought by individuals to address systemic fault, we should instead hope that 
the executive is vigilant at holding such inquiries where appropriate. 
G. Resolving Conflicts of Justice after ACC 
I have stated that the proper way to resolve conflicts between the competing 
conceptions of justice at play here is through the democratic process. Changes 
to the scheme by successive compensation Acts show that the idea of a fair 
distribution of the cost of accidents varies over time and with changes of 
government. It is clear that the distributive justice philosophy of the architects 
of the first Accident Compensation Act differed from that of those responsible 
for the Accident Rehabilitation Compensation Insurance Act 1992, and for that 
matter the philosophy of the Woodhouse Commission. 
Further, the law’s approach to resolution of conflicts between the 
distributive justice of the scheme, and corrective and retributive justice, has 
changed over time. Two particular interactions illustrate this: the relationship 
between ACC and reparation, and the scheme’s treatment of injuries caused 
during serious criminal offending. 
1. Topping-up ACC entitlements with reparation 
The sentence of reparation involves a payment from the offender to victim and 
serves corrective justice. This treatment cannot fit with distributive justice 
because some injury victims receive additional compensation simply because 
they are also victims of crime. This clash was considered in the case of Davies 
v Police,64 where the Supreme Court addressed whether reparation could be 
awarded for the 20 per cent of lost earnings that the ACC scheme provides no 
compensation for.  
A majority in the Supreme Court considered that the Sentencing Act 2002 
was not intended to allow top-ups of ACC entitlements, as that would be 
inconsistent with the philosophy of the ACC scheme. The philosophy that the 
majority had in mind was the “social contract” explanation of the scheme: at a 
broad level, the scheme was a trade for the ability to claim damages from 
                                                          
62 See “The Pike River Royal Commission” (2011) 
<http://pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz/>. 
63 See “The Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission” (2011) <http://canterbury. 
royalcommission.govt.nz/>. 
64 Davies v Police [2008] NZSC 4, [2009] 3 NZLR 189. 
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wrongdoers.65 The majority also stressed that allowing reparation to top-up 
ACC entitlements would allow victims of crime to receive greater entitlements 
than those suffering injury when no offence was committed or no one is 
prosecuted. Tipping J used quite strong judicial language and found that the 
practice would “go against the whole philosophy and purpose of the accident 
compensation scheme.”66 The minority view was that the practice of topping-
up ACC entitlements with reparation was inconsistent with aspects of the 
philosophy of the ACC scheme, but that had to be weighed against the purpose 
of the Sentencing Act, which included providing for the interests of victims of 
crime.67 
Until Davies reached the Supreme Court, it was common for courts to 
award reparation topping-up ACC entitlements. The High Court68 and Court of 
Appeal69 both had no objection to the practice. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
is six pages long, and reveals no suggestion of the dire clash of philosophy that 
concerned the majority of the Supreme Court. 
It seems that Davies will not be the final word on this issue, as the 
Government has introduced a Bill that would overturn the decision.70 
2. Withholding entitlements from offenders 
The Accident Compensation Act 1972 did not distinguish between accidents 
suffered during lawful acts and accidents suffered during the commission of 
criminal acts. This is entirely consistent with a distributive justice philosophy 
of consistent treatment for all victims of injury. However, retributive justice 
holds that wrongful acts should receive a response, and limiting a wrongdoer’s 
access to entitlements under the ACC scheme is one way of achieving this. 
However, the public became dissatisfied with the idea that criminals could 
receive compensation for injuries suffered while committing crimes71 (or, at 
least, legislators considered that the public held this view72). This led to a new 
                                                          
65 See “1. Inconsistent understandings of the scheme” at page 22 for further discussion of the 
“social contract” philosophy of ACC. 
66 Davies v Police, above n 64, at [48]. 
67 At [81] per McGrath J. 
68 Davies v Police (2007) 8 NZELC. 98,691 (HC). 
69 Davies v Police [2008] 2 NZLR 645 (CA). 
70 Victims of Crime Reform Bill 2011, cl 46. The explanatory note to the Bill explicitly states 
that the intention is to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Davies. At the time of 
writing, the Bill has passed its first reading and is being considered by the Justice and 
Electoral Committee. 
71 In New Zealand reference is sometimes made to ACC paying compensation to offenders 
injured while evading capture as the archetypal example of when it is appropriate to withhold 
compensation. This scenario has actually happened at least twice. In 1982 a prisoner was 
injured while escaping prison, although the prisoner in question was never charged, convicted 
or sentenced for the escape (see (14 October 2004) 620 NZPD 15184). In 2007, a convicted 
murderer had a leg amputated after he was shot by police who were pursuing him after he 
breached parole. (R v Burton HC Wellington CRI-2007-085-736, 3 April 2007). 
72 The Government Cabinet/Caucus Committee Report The New Zealand Accident 
Compensation Scheme: A Review (October 1980) stated at 13 that “[t]here is clearly a strong 
public feeling that injuries received in the course of and as a result of committing certain 
crimes should not come under the umbrella of comprehensive entitlement.” During the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286660 
December 2012 Justice for Victims of Injury 199 
provision under the Accident Compensation Act 1982 which allowed the 
Corporation to withhold entitlements from an offender injured during the 
commission of a serious criminal offence, if providing entitlements would be 
“repugnant to justice”.73 
The idea that payment of compensation for an accidental injury could be 
“repugnant to justice” seems alien to the distributive justice philosophy of the 
scheme. However, the sentiment behind this new provision was not entirely 
alien to the common law. It is reflected in the maxim of “ex turpi causa non 
oritur action” or “no right of action arises from a shameful cause”.74 The Court 
of Appeal discussed the meaning of the phrase “repugnant to justice” in ACC v 
Curtis,75 and found that the principled basis for overriding the no-fault 
philosophy of the ACC scheme was concerned with “community responses to 
serious criminal offending.”76 The Court concluded that: “it is impossible to 
escape the conclusion that fundamentally s 92 is there to penalise certain 
criminals for their conduct, albeit in very limited circumstances and in a highly 
specific way” to serve “certain familiar objectives of justice” – primarily 
retribution, but also condemnation, deterrence and reparation.77 
The purpose of the “repugnant to justice” provision is therefore to set out a 
test for when the conflict between retributive justice and distributive justice 
should be resolved in favour of retribution. It is a clear rejection of the idea 
that compensation should only be governed by distributive justice, and shows 
that retributive justice has enough political value to override the philosophy of 
the scheme, but only in cases where compensation would be especially 
offensive to retributive justice.  
The “repugnant to justice” test remained in place until 2010, when it was 
replaced by a stricter provision.78 The new provision raised the threshold of 
seriousness of the offence required79 and replaced the “repugnant to justice” 
test for withholding entitlements with a presumption that entitlements would 
                                                                                                                               
introductory speech for the Bill that, after amendment, became the Accident Compensation 
Act 1982, the Minister of Labour repeated the sentence quoted above and stated that “[i]t is 
considered that the public should not be called on to compensate the authors of their own 
misfortune when relatively serious criminal activity is involved.” 435 NZPD 4799. 
73 Accident Compensation Act 1982, s 92. The section required that offence be serious enough 
that the offender was sentenced to imprisonment. The Corporation could withhold 
compensation payments and rehabilitation but not treatment. 
74 The purpose of this principle is not to protect a defendant from the consequences of their 
conduct but in an appropriate case to withhold relief from an undeserving plaintiff. The scope 
of the principle remains disputed and its application is uncertain, see Stephen Todd (ed) The 
Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at 1020–1021. 
75 ACC v Curtis [1994] 2 NZLR 519 (CA). 
76 At 525. 
77 At 525. The reference to “reparation” is odd since withholding ACC entitlements does not 
seem to provide any reparation to the victim. 
78 Accident Compensation Amendment Act 2010, s 13. 
79 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 122. The original section required that the offender was 
sentenced to imprisonment. The amended section required that the offender was sentenced to 
imprisonment or home detention, and in addition required that the offence was punishable by 
a maximum term of two years or more. 
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not be paid.80 This presumption is subject to a discretion by the Minister for 
ACC to allow entitlements to be paid if “there are exceptional circumstances 
relating to the claimant.”81 The strictness of the new provision in contrast to 
the previous legislation reflects an ideology that sees criminal wrongdoing in 
terms of personal responsibility rather than as a social problem. 
3. The consequences of leaving these questions of justice to the political system 
Leaving the question of which distributive justice criterion ought to underpin 
the scheme to be determined by the political process leads to continual changes 
in the scheme’s scope and funding because the idea of what is a just 
distribution of the cost of accidents varies over time. The resulting conflicts 
between the scheme and corrective or retributive justice leads to inconsistent 
treatment of different injury victims. These consequences are necessary evils 
and are preferable to the alternative, which is to adhere to a particular ideal as 
just for injury victims, notwithstanding that that ideal may once have been 
accepted in New Zealand’s history but no longer is. Distributive justice cannot 
always trumps corrective and retributive justice. We accept that society’s 
distributive justice philosophy in relation to welfare and taxation will change 
over time and with changes of government. There is no reason that the 
philosophy of the ACC scheme should be exempt from the democratic process. 
H. Assessing the Performance of Parliament 
Changes like the cuts to the scheme under the 1992 Act should be seen as a 
natural result of the political process rather than an unconscionable breach of a 
social contract. Updating the accident compensation legislation to match the 
current popular concept of what is just for injury victims is a proper function 
of the legislature. Of course, one can dispute the currently prevailing idea of 
justice, but this is a political dispute over which principles should determine 
compensation and how to prioritise compensation alongside other policy 
objectives. However, this does not mean that the legislature is immune from 
criticism. In implementing its political policy, Parliament should enact 
legislation that demonstrates that policy, to guide the Courts. If a principle is to 
be adopted, it should be applied consistently. Let us consider two incidents in 
the history of ACC where Parliament has failed to do these things. 
First, there is the legislative overturn of Daniels v Thompson.82 The 
decision concerned the relationship between exemplary damages and the 
criminal law. A majority of the Court of Appeal found that the civil law should 
defer to the criminal in matters of punishment.83 Daniels v Thompson was 
                                                          
80 As with the earlier version of the section, there is no provision to withhold treatment. 
81 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 122A. The legislation gives no guidance as to what 
might qualify as exceptional circumstances. 
82 Daniels v Thompson, above n 38. 
83 The majority view sees the function of exemplary damages as to punish and deter outrageous 
wrongdoing. This function overlaps with the criminal law. Where criminal sanctions have 
already been applied, it would be double punishment to impose a further penalty by an award 
of exemplary damages. Where a person has been acquitted, it is undesirable to re-litigate the 
same facts for the purpose of punishment. If conviction or acquittal bar proceedings for 
exemplary damages, then it would be an abuse of process to make a claim for exemplary 
damages after the commencement of a prosecution, because the claim may disappear. Where 
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overturned by a provision of the 1998 Act, providing that a criminal conviction 
or acquittal did not prevent a court awarding exemplary damages.84 
If there was a principled basis for this provision, it certainly is not clear 
from the legislation.85 The legislature’s conception of the proper purpose of 
exemplary damages is not at all clear – all that is clear is that the thinking of 
the majority in Daniels v Thompson was rejected. The failure of the legislature 
to set out a coherent rationale for the overturn of Daniels v Thompson means 
that it is impossible for the courts to develop the law of exemplary damages in 
New Zealand without risking a legislative rebuke. 
Since it is not possible to know Parliament’s rationale for this legislative 
action, it is not really possible for the courts to reform exemplary damages 
without risking contradicting that rationale. Perhaps this leaves the legislature 
responsible for cleaning up the somewhat confused position of exemplary 
damages in New Zealand. 
The second example of the legislature acting inconsistently with principle 
is with respect to lump sum compensation for mental suffering. The pre-ACC 
civil law provided compensation for mental suffering by making lump sum 
awards of damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life in cases 
of physical, as did the original ACC scheme. The original ACC scheme was 
more generous, and also provided compensation on the same basis for mental 
suffering that was not accompanied by physical injury. 
However, from the 1992 Act onwards, the ACC scheme has not provided 
lump sum compensation for mental suffering as a separate head of entitlement. 
The 1992 Act provides cover for “mental injury” which could lead to 
entitlements, for example weekly compensation for lost earnings if the mental 
injury led to an inability to work. The 2001 Act re-introduced lump sum 
compensation, but not for pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. 
Following the introduction of the ACC scheme, the provision of lump sum 
compensation for mental suffering began to appear elsewhere in the law: the 
criminal law began to provide reparation for emotional harm in 1987,86 and 
since then various legislative measures have allowed for compensation for 
mental suffering in a number of different contexts involving fault,87 leading 
Professor Smillie to remark in 1997 that “it seems that the only form of mental 
suffering that does not normally qualify for an award of lump sum monetary 
compensation is that which results from physical injury to the person.”88 
Lump sum compensation for mental suffering was removed from the 
scheme because of concerns over cost. These later developments impose that 
                                                                                                                               
no criminal prosecution has been instituted it would be appropriate to stay civil proceedings 
until it becomes clearer whether there will be a prosecution. If it became clear that there 
would be no prosecution, the civil action could then proceed. 
84 Accident Insurance Act 1998, s 396. 
85 Or from the legislative debate: see Allan Beever “The Future of Exemplary Damages in New 
Zealand” (2010) 24 NZULR 197 at 217–218. 
86 Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1987, s 2. 
87 For example, breaches of privacy (Privacy Act 1993, s 88(1)) breaches of Human Rights 
(Human Rights Act 1993, s 86(1)) personal grievances in employment (Employment 
Relations Act 2000, s 123(1)(c)(i)). 
88 John Smillie “Exemplary Damages for Personal Injury” [1997] NZ L Rev 140 at 152. 
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cost on parties considered to be at fault. Yet, the idea that only those at fault 
pay compensation for mental suffering is a fiction since much of the cost will 
ultimately be absorbed by the community.89 
Cost to the community provides a justification for limiting compensation – 
but does not provide a principled basis for providing lump sum compensation 
for mental suffering in almost all cases other than physical injury to the person. 
The law in this area has developed haphazardly: there does not appear to be 
any consistent legislative policy behind who qualifies for lump sum 
compensation for emotional harm. If compensating mental suffering by way of 
lump sum payments is arbitrary and too expensive for the community then it 
ought not to be done at all. Given the prevalence of various statutory measures 
providing compensation for mental suffering, complete withdrawal of such 
measures seems politically unfeasible. If that is the case, then compensation 
for mental suffering should be returned to the scheme. Compensation for 
mental suffering need not be extravagant. Indeed, a modest provision for 
awards of compensation for mental suffering under the accident compensation 
scheme could provide a model for compensation for mental suffering in other 
areas. 
Although I argue that the choice of which principle should govern the ACC 
scheme is the proper domain of Parliament, this does not justify legislation 
with no clear principled basis. The legislative repeal of Daniels v Thompson 
was an unhelpful step and has left the law of exemplary damages in 
New Zealand in a muddled state. Similarly, the inconsistent position regarding 
lump sum compensation for mental suffering is open to criticism. This appears 
to be the result of ad hoc lawmaking rather than a deliberate principled policy 
choice. 
I. Assessing the Performance of the Courts 
Interpreting legislation in accordance with the intent of the legislature and 
developing the common law to meet the needs of society are two main 
functions of the courts. The courts’ performance of these functions in the 
aftermath of the ACC scheme has been quite inconsistent.  
1. Inconsistent understandings of the scheme 
Interpreting the accident compensation legislation in accordance with the 
intent of the legislature requires an understanding of what the legislature 
intended by implementing the scheme – what the scheme was introduced to 
achieve and what the principled or philosophical basis for doing so is. The 
courts’ understanding of the scheme has been internally inconsistent and on 
several occasions Parliament has rejected the approach that the courts have 
taken.  
I have already mentioned that the Government has introduced legislation to 
overturn Davies, suggesting that the majority of the Supreme Court gave too 
                                                          
89 The cost to a state entity paying compensation for mental suffering that it or an employee has 
caused becomes a cost to the community. An employer required to pay compensation for 
mental suffering can pass that cost on to consumers. Furthermore, as the Woodhouse Report, 
above n 12, recognised at 50, insurance provides an additional mechanism whereby costs 
initially imposed on parties found to be at fault are spread across the community. 
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much weight to their conception of the social contract philosophy of the ACC 
scheme and did not fully consider the corrective justice/compensatory role of 
today’s criminal law.90 The legislative overturn of Daniels v Thompson 
suggests an additional difference of views over the function of exemplary 
damages.91 
Early on, two different judicial approaches to the scheme emerged. The 
first approach, influenced by the philosophy of the Woodhouse Report, is to 
see the scheme as a response to the social problem of injury regardless of how 
the injury was caused. The second approach is to construe the scheme more 
narrowly and as a response to the inconsistent outcomes provided by the 
negligence action. If the scheme is merely a replacement for the negligence 
action, then it follows that the scope of the scheme, and with it the bar on 
proceedings for damages, should be restricted to the kinds of injuries which 
might have been the subject of negligence actions – which therefore excludes 
illness92 and injuries caused by intentional torts. 
The first approach is exemplified by decisions like Wallbutton93 and ACC v 
Mitchell,94 which extended cover to illness-related conditions, and G v 
Auckland Hospital Board,95 which found that an injury caused by an 
intentional tort was an “accident” and covered by the scheme. These cases all 
adopted an approach developed in English workers’ compensation decisions96 
that what is an “accident” is to be considered from the point of view of the 
victim. Thus, a back injury to an already-diseased spine caused by bending 
over (Wallbutton), the death of an infant who stopped breathing during a sleep 
apnoea attack (Mitchell) and a rape (G v Auckland Hospital Board) were all 
regarded as accidents, since they were unlooked for from the point of view of 
the victim. 
The second approach is exemplified by Cooke J’s comment in Donselaar97 
that the mischief that the scheme set out to remedy was primarily the 
inconsistent compensation provided by actions for negligence, and his later 
remark in Willis v Attorney-General98 that the scheme was fundamentally a 
replacement for negligence law, and careful scrutiny must be applied to any 
extension of the scheme, and the bar on proceedings, beyond that. 
                                                          
90 See above page 17 at “1. Topping-up ACC entitlements with reparation.” 
91 See above page 20 at “H. Assessing the Performance of Parliament”. 
92 See the NZLJ editor’s response to Craig Brown and John Smillie’s “The future of Accident 
Compensation” [1991] NZLJ 249, at 249: “The view that accident injuries and sickness 
should be regarded as indistinguishable is not one that is necessarily just in the opinion of 
many people … Nobody of course has ever been able to sue Nature or some such entity for 
… the multitudinous ailments that the flesh is heir to … To treat negligence however as being 
of the same order as disease is contrary to any normal sense of justice.” 
93 Wallbutton v ACC [1983] NZACR 629 (HC). 
94 ACC v Mitchell [1992] 2 NZLR 436 (CA). 
95 G v Auckland Hospital Board, above n 34. 
96 In particular, Lord Diplock’s comments in Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services 
[1972] 1 AC 944 at 980. 
97 Donselaar v Donselaar, above n 35, at 104. 
98 Willis v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 574 (CA) at 5–6. 
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In Willis, Cooke P thought that judges could apply common sense as to 
whether a claim fell within the broad spirit of the scheme. This might have 
been the case if there was a genuine consensus on the philosophy of the 
scheme. Judges applying their own personal conceptions of the spirit of the 
scheme leads to anomalous results.99 Holland J used Cooke P’s comments in 
ACC v F100 to reach the conclusion that the scheme did not provide cover to 
secondary victims, marking a retreat from the hitherto generous approach that 
the courts had been taking to the meaning of “accident” and showing that 
different courts had very different conceptions of the spirit of the scheme. The 
question of how generously to approach cover at the edges of the scheme 
continues to receive inconsistent responses from the judiciary.101 
Later, the higher courts appeared to prefer the idea that the ACC scheme 
should be understood as a social contract: the scheme is not merely a 
replacement for negligence, but was received in exchange for giving up the 
right to sue. As the Court of Appeal put it in Wilding:102 
The philosophy of the personal injury compensation legislation, as is well known, is 
to substitute an entitlement to claim compensation, capped as to amount, on a no-
fault basis for the right to bring a court proceeding for damages for the injury or to 
seek in other ways damages or compensation. 
The reasoning of the “social contract” philosophy of ACC runs as follows: 
The scheme was a response to the unsatisfactory treatment of victims of injury 
under the status quo ante, primarily because the tort of negligence provided 
such inconsistent results for different victims of injury. The right to sue for 
compensation was exchanged for the right to claim under the scheme. So, any 
return to a situation that makes compensation available to some victims of 
                                                          
99 For example, in JRB v ARCIC DC Wellington 42/98, 18 March 1998 and Estate Black v 
ARCIC DC Wellington 233/98, 11 November 1998 Judge Middleton interpreted the 
provisions of the 1992 Act relating to disentitlement for wilfully self-inflicted injuries and 
suicide in a way which was contrary to the clear wording of the statute, based on the Judge’s 
conception of Parliament’s intent for the scheme. This erroneous interpretation was addressed 
ten years later in Estate Hjaltason v ACC DC Wellington 111/2008, 29 May 2008. In the 
mean time, claimants for such injuries under the 1992 Act were denied their proper 
entitlements on the basis of one Judge’s conception of the spirit of the scheme. 
100 ACC v F [1991] (HC) 1 NZLR 234. The case concerned whether one person could receive 
cover for their own mental consequences resulting from an accident suffered by another 
person. Mr F’s wife suffered personal injury by accident by medical misadventure, and as a 
result sexual relations between F and his wife became impossible. F developed a reactive 
depression or neurosis. Approaching this case from the point of view of F as a victim, his 
wife’s injury was surely an unlooked for misfortune and on that basis an “accident”. 
However, Holland J’s finding that Mr F was not covered by the scheme does make sense if 
considered in the context of the scheme being a replacement for negligence, because, as a 
secondary victim, Mr F may well not have been able to succeed in a claim for his mental 
injury (see the discussion on secondary victims in The Law of Torts in New Zealand, above 
n 74, at 187–199). 
101 For example, Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2003] 3 NZLR 289 (CA) (injury to foetus 
causing stillbirth was injury to mother), ACC v D [2008] NZCA 576 (unwanted pregnancy 
following failed sterilization not an injury (overturning ACC v D [2007] NZAR 679 (HC)) 
but later overturned by Keith Allenby v H [2012] NZSC 33. 
102 Wilding, above n 48, at [11] (emphasis added). 
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injury and not others undermines the exchange. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the scheme is retracted, the right to sue expands to fill the gap. 
This idea has been influential on the courts’ understanding of the 
relationship between the scheme and the civil and criminal law. The social 
contact philosophy was used to justify the finding in Queenstown Lakes 
District Council v Palmer103 that the civil law would expand when the scheme 
was drawn back. The majority of the Supreme Court in Davies104 reasoned that 
the social contract meant that reparation should not top up ACC entitlements 
and provide full compensation. And the risk of undermining the ACC social 
contract by allowing exemplary damages to take on a compensatory function is 
a common theme in decisions on exemplary damages in New Zealand.105 
Since it is based on the idea that the scheme is an exchange rather than a 
remedy for the social problem of injury, the social contract philosophy has 
more in common with the second understanding of the scheme set out above 
than the first. However, the social contract philosophy sees the scheme as a 
trade for the right to claim compensatory damages generally rather than as a 
replacement for negligence specifically. The bar on proceedings extends far 
beyond compensation for negligence, and bars claims for compensation for 
personal injury in cases of breaches of NZBORA106 and the criminal law.107 If 
the scheme is an exchange for the right to sue for compensation then Re 
Chase,108 where the Court of Appeal found that the bar on proceedings for 
personal injury extended to nominal damages, must be wrongly decided since 
nominal damages are not compensatory. Payment of a nominal sum does not 
give some injury victims more compensation than others so cannot undermine 
the scheme. 
The social contract philosophy of ACC is inconsistent with the decisions 
that allow exemplary damages in cases of injury.109 If reparation payments that 
lead to inconsistent outcomes undermine the scheme, then clearly exemplary 
damages also undermine the scheme. It is no answer to the charge of 
undermining the scheme to say that exemplary damages are awarded to punish 
and deter, since it is the windfall to some injury victims and not others that 
creates the inconsistency, regardless of the reason for the payment. The 
                                                          
103 Queenstown Lakes District Council v Palmer [1999] 1 NZLR 549 (CA). 
104 Davies v Police, above n 64. 
105 For example, Tipping J in Couch v Attorney-General, above n 40, [108] opined that 
“New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme means it is particularly desirable that our 
legal system have a clear and principled line between cases of negligence causing personal 
injury which justify exemplary damages and those which do not. This feature of our legal 
system also means that we must keep conceptually as clear as possible the line between 
punishment and compensation”. 
106 Wilding v Attorney General, above n 48. 
107 Davies, above n 104. Strictly speaking, the bar on proceedings under the accident 
compensation does not apply to reparation, which is not a proceedings. However, the 
majority of the Supreme Court interpreted the Sentencing Act 2002 in light of their 
understanding of the philosophy behind the bar. 
108 Re Chase, above n 45. 
109 Donselaar v Donselaar, above n 35, affirmed in Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] 1 
NZLR 732 (CA), and recently in Couch, above n 40. 
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Supreme Court in Couch, which included four members of the same Court that 
sat in Davies,110 did not address this point – other than perhaps Tipping J’s 
musing that Donselaar v Donselaar may have been wrongly decided but was 
now too firmly entrenched to be overruled.111 
The courts have thus been internally inconsistent with respect to the 
understanding of the legislative intent of the scheme applied when interpreting 
the accident compensation legislation. There are also several cases where it 
appears that the judiciary and legislative branches of government have had 
different ideas about the ACC scheme and the relationship between the civil 
and criminal law in light of the scheme. 
Whether the Accident Compensation Act 1972 really represented a social 
contract is unclear. The Woodhouse Report described a replacement for the 
status quo ante measures of compensation for injury, not an exchange for 
negligence or tort liability injury. Political bargaining affected the content of 
the first Accident Compensation Act. The Report had not recommended 
compensation in the form of lump sums, or compensation for mental suffering, 
but they were ultimately included in the legislation after lobbying by various 
groups, particularly the unions. However, the terms of that bargain were not 
clear, especially with respect to whether the bargain included giving up access 
to the intentional torts. The retrenchments to the scheme in the 1992 Act are 
not the work of a state respecting a social contract. Even though the purpose of 
the 2001 Act refers to reinforcing the social contract of the first scheme,112 that 
Act retained a number of the retrenchments effected by the 1992 Act, 
including the removal of compensation for mental suffering.  
ACC v Mitchell113 and ACC v F114 probably extended the scheme beyond 
what the legislators intended by taking a particularly generous approach to the 
meaning of “personal injury by accident.” Following their election in 1990, the 
National government certainly claimed that judicial decisions had extended the 
scheme’s boundaries beyond what was originally intended.115 Adopting the 
approach of considering “accident” from the point of the view of the victim 
that had developed in English workers’ compensation cases may have been 
consistent with the philosophy of the Woodhouse Report but did not 
necessarily reflect the intent of New Zealand legislators. 
2. Developing the Common Law 
The ACC scheme has put pressure on the courts to develop the civil law so that 
it can continue to provide the function of responding to wrongdoing causing 
injury even though it no longer provides the function of compensating the 
victim. The courts’ development of the civil law has been tempered by the 
concern that the civil law could regain its former function of providing 
                                                          
110 Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ. 
111 Couch v Attorney-General, above n 40, at [86]. 
112 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 3. 
113 ACC v Mitchell, above n 94. 
114 ACC v F, above n 100. 
115 Hon W F Birch Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme (Wellington, Department of 
Labour, 1991) at 8. 
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compensation to victims of injury, and thereby undermine the ACC scheme. 
Even Thomas J, the most enthusiastic promoter of developing exemplary 
damages for “securing the wider functions of tort law”116 did not say that 
compensation for injury was a proper function of exemplary damages. 
The courts have failed to develop a widely-accepted jurisprudence of 
exemplary damages in New Zealand following the introduction of the ACC 
scheme, and the issue has generated a series of inconsistent judgments. The 
most recent example of this is the Supreme Court in Couch, where the Court 
displayed attitudes towards the legitimacy and function of exemplary damages 
ranging from enthusiastic support117 to discomfort.118 The confused position of 
exemplary damages in New Zealand is in part because of the legislative 
overturn of Daniels v Thompson, but the courts must take a fair share of the 
blame. 
Re Chase119 provided an opportunity for the Court of Appeal to ensure that 
the common law could continue to vindicate common law rights post-ACC. 
The House of Lords recently considered nominal damages in Ashley v Chief 
Constable of Sussex Police,120 a case with “strikingly similar”121 facts. By a 
majority of three to two, the House of Lords found that a claim could be 
pursued solely to provide the function of vindicating the contention that the 
deceased’s death had been caused by unlawful battery, even though the chief 
constable had admitted liability for negligence and paid compensation. That is, 
the trespass claim could proceed even if corrective justice and compensation 
had been satisfied, because vindication of rights was a proper function of the 
civil law. The minority thought that vindication was not a sufficient basis for 
allowing the claim to proceed under the circumstances, and that once liability 
was accepted and compensation was paid the civil law’s job was essentially 
done.122 The majority of the House of Lords ensured that the English civil law 
continues to protect common law rights, recognising that for the common law 
to be a strong protector of rights it must be able to do more than simply 
facilitate compensation following a breach. The ability of the civil law of New 
Zealand to respond to wrongdoing has been limited as a result of the 
introduction of the ACC scheme – in part because of the Court of Appeal’s 
failure in Re Chase to ensure that following the introduction of the ACC 
scheme the civil law could still vindicate the right of citizens not to be 
subjected to unlawful battery. 
                                                          
116 Daniels v Thompson, above n 43, at 71. 
117 Couch v Attorney-General, above n 40, at [4] per Elias CJ who spoke of “the vitality of the 
exemplary principle in meeting the needs of modern New Zealand society”. 
118 At [59] per Blanchard J who was “uncomfortable” with the idea that a civil court should mete 
out punishment but thought there was a proper moral role for exemplary damages in deterring 
outrageous conduct. 
119 Re Chase, above n 45. 
120 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962. 
121 At [131], per Lord Neuberger. 
122 At [81]. Lord Carswell thought that “the civil courts exist to award compensation, not to 
conduct public inquiries [or] provide explanations”. Lord Neuberger said at [130] that 
pursuing the claim solely on the grounds of vindication on a point of principle was a “rather 
limited purpose”. 
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The introduction of the ACC scheme has been a catalyst for questions 
about the function of the post-ACC civil law. The differing views expressed by 
different Judges about the role of exemplary damages in New Zealand can be 
attributed to a failure to agree over the role of retributive justice in the civil 
law. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Chase follows from taking a 
particular view on the civil law, one where the function of the civil law is 
confined to compensation and does not allow for vindication.123 
J. Conclusion 
The ACC scheme was intended to forever change the civil law in New Zealand 
by taking over the function of compensating injury victims. The scheme has 
also had major unintended consequences for the civil and criminal law in New 
Zealand. These unintended consequences show that making a major change to 
the common law is no simple matter. The law of torts provided socially valued 
functions other than compensating the victim, leading to a desire that these 
functions survive the introduction of the scheme. The criminal law now 
promotes corrective justice and addresses certain types of inadvertent 
wrongdoing that would previously have been dealt with by the civil law. The 
civil law now has a very limited ability to address wrongdoing that causes 
injury and the development of exemplary damages in particular has been 
influenced by the scheme. The unintended consequences of the introduction of 
ACC themselves even had unintended consequences: the introduction of 
reparation produced inconsistent outcomes for victims of crime which 
Parliament responded to by introducing the offender levy scheme to provide 
additional compensation to some victims of crime. 
Different conceptions of justice can provide an account of a “just” outcome 
following injury: corrective, retributive and distributive justice can all suggest 
a different way to achieve “justice” for causers and victims of injury. There is 
no logical meta-principle which can tell us which conceptions of justice should 
have priority, or which conception of distributive justice we should adopt: 
these matters are questions of politics and ideology. We should expect 
conflicts between different conceptions of justice in the overlap between the 
ACC scheme and the civil and criminal law, and we should expect that the 
“philosophy” of how to resolve these conflicts and of the ACC scheme itself 
will vary over time and with changes of government. Attempting to understand 
the ACC scheme on the assumption that it has a coherent philosophy had led 
the courts horribly astray – the courts have not even been able to develop an 
internally consistent understanding of the philosophy of the scheme. 
Attempting to do so is a hopeless project because there is no coherent common 
philosophy underlying all the different accident compensation Acts.124  
                                                          
123 Couch gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit the decision on nominal damages in 
Re Chase, but the opportunity was not taken. 
124 The fact that the scheme has remained in place does not imply a consistent principled reason 
for doing so. The “insurance-based” scheme of the 1992 and 1998 Acts is a quite different 
philosophical understanding of the scheme than that provided in the Woodhouse Report or 
represented in the scheme that came into force on 1 April 1974. 
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